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How Much Process is "Due"?
Parolees and Prisoners
By MATHEW 0. ToBR IER* AND HAROLD COHEN* *
IN -the past five years there has been a revolutionary expansion in
the area of constitutional law known as procedural due process. The
constitutional principle underlying this development stems from the
language of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution which provides that neither the federal government nor
the states shall deprive any person "of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."' In substance, this language reflects the funda-
mental notion that no man shall suffer significant injury at the hand
of the state without the protection of an adequate notice of the proposed
sanction and a full opportunity to defend himself.
2
Prior to 1969, the courts applied this mandate of "due process"
largely to judicial proceedings: to trials of civil actions, and, more
frequently, to criminal prosecutions. In 1969, however, the United
States Supreme Court decided Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.8 and
opened the door to a wide range of decisions that expanded the reach
of due process far beyond the courtroom setting. On June 29, 1972,
in one of the most significant milestones of the new line of decisions,
the United States Supreme Court held in Morrissey v. Brewer4 that be-
fore a state could revoke a parolee's parole and order him returned
to prison, the parolee under the due process clause should be given
notice of the grounds for the proposed revocation and a hearing at
which he could have an opportunity to submit a defense.
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California. A.B., Stanford, 1924; M.A.,
Stanford, 1925; LL.B., Harvard, 1927; S..D., University of California, 1932.
** A.B., Rochester, 1966; J.D., Harvard, 1969; member, California Bar.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
2. "Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or
property without notice and an opportunity to make his defence [sic]." Baldwin v. Hale,
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1864). See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 438 (1932).
3. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
4. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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The recent explosion of due process decisions 5 provides broad
outlines of the situations in which the due process clause initially comes
into play, that is, when an individual must be given some opportunity
to be heard. These decisions, however, generally provide little guidance
for determining in any particular "due process" setting precisely what
form the required notice and hearing must take, where the hearing should
be held, and which of the numerous procedural safeguards-such as
counsel, cross-examination, or the subpoena power-must be afforded.
Some recent decisions, while emphasizing the flexibility of the
"due process" demands, have intimated that the breadth and scope of
the required hearing varies with the degree of deprivation which an
individual might suffer. These decisions suggest that the greater the
possible deprivation-imprisonment following an initial conviction, for
example-the more procedural safeguards are required, and the lesser
the deprivation-the temporary loss of a driver's license-the fewer
constitutionally mandated procedures. The severity of deprivation is
certainly one legitimate factor to be considered in determining whether
a given procedure is required or not; the more severe the penalty, the
greater the need to structure a procedure which will minimize erroneous
determinations. This approach, however, cannot serve as the sole,
or even the most important, criterion in resolving the adequacy of pro-
cedure in specific cases.
Establishment of a "pecking order" of the relative severity of dis-
parate deprivations would largely be a subjective task as to which is
more serious: dismissal from a job or eviction from one's home, loss
of a driver's license or a misdemeanor conviction for disturbing the
peace, the attachment of one's refrigerator or stigmatization as an "ex-
cessive drinker"? Second, and more important, even if we could agree
on a satisfactory "pecking order," this alone would not provide a guide
as to which particular safeguards could be eliminated for a less serious
deprivation, or which procedures must be afforded for a more drastic
penalty or loss.
Another suggestion has been that the degree of "due process"
to which one is entitled depends upon whether the proceeding is ad-
ministrative or judicial, and if judicial, whether it is civil or criminal.
The assumption underlying this analysis appears to be that there is
a hierarchy of due process hearings, ranging from the most informal
5. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.




at the lowest administrative level to the most formal in a criminal trial.
This model envisages due process rights as a "package" with each level
of formality including more and more of the incidents of due process.
In our view, instead of concentrating solely on the severity of the
threatened sanction or the characterization of the hearing's setting as
administrative or judicial, we must focus on the substantive nature of
the inquiry undertaken because the nature of the inquiry fixes its attri-
butes and characteristics. We shall try to develop the thesis that the
particularly sought procedural safeguard must be weighed in the scale
of its value in affording a fair hearing as to the substance of the in-
quiry. We must determine the importance of such a safeguard in pro-
viding a fair hearing on the underlying substantive issue to be resolved.
In undertaking this analysis, we must look not only to the substantive
question at issue but to the purpose of the particular safeguard under
consideration.
Our reference to the substantive inquiry of a particular hearing
does not refer to the ultimate legal conclusion that may be presented
in a given setting-for example, should a teacher lose his teaching cre-
dential, should property be attached or should a prisoner be granted
parole. Rather the substantive inquiry relates to the underlying, fre-
quently factual, questions which determine the ultimate conclusion. For
example: 'Did the teacher use methods improper under current educa-
tional standards?" "Is the debtor likely to flee the state to avoid execu-
tion on a judgment?" "Does the prisoner have a stable environment
in which to live outside of prison?" We believe that it is the nature
of these underlying questions which, to a large degree, should dictate
the form a due process hearing should take.
One example may help to explain the general thesis we are pro-
posing. Under recent decisions it is clear that a tenured teacher cannot
be dismissed from his job without "notice and hearing." State law
may establish a variety of grounds upon which dismissal may be based,
however, and these grounds may influence the shape the required "no-
tice and hearing' may take. On the one hand, for example, the state
may provide that one ground for dismissal is a teacher's "persistent vio-
lation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the state"; a hearing
examining a dismissal on such grounds will probably deal with many
contested factual issues and may require testimony by various eyewit-
6. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1972); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558-59
(1956).
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nesses to the alleged incidents of misconduct. On the other hand, the
state may enact a loyalty oath and provide that refusal to take the
oath is itself a ground for dismissal. A hearing on such a dismissal
will differ substantially from the former misconduct hearing, because
the state law may make the teacher's refusal or nonrefusal to take the
oath the only relevant factual matter at such a hearing; the full pano-
ply of evidentiary safeguards, e.g., confrontation or cross-examination,
probably would not be essential to determine whether or not the teacher
has refused to sign the oath. Similarly, when state law provides for
the dismissal of a teacher on the basis of a conviction of a specific
crime, the teacher's guaranteed hearing may be very limited in scope,
passing only on whether or not the teacher has in fact suffered such
a conviction.
We need a workable analytical framework in the procedural due
process field not only for courts faced with the question of determining
the constitutionality of established procedures but also for legislators
and administrators who are attempting to devise permissible procedures
for use in the future. The revolutionary expansion of due process in
recent years means that in many fields administrators must begin for
the first time to grapple with these difficult and complex constitutional
questions.
In the instant article we shall attempt to demonstrate our analytical
approach by a brief discussion of the application of due process in the
prison setting in the wake of Morrissey.7 In the prison environment
a variety of problems call for different applications of the due process
principle. In some cases certain protections of procedural due process
should apply; in other circumstances, other aspects should prevail. The
problems include such matters as parole release decisions and prison
disciplinary matters. In devising procedural schemes to be used in test-
ing such procedures against constitutional demands, we search for
guideposts for evaluating the need for particular procedures in these
varied settings.
To illustrate how the importance of a particular safeguard varies
with the substance of the inquiry, and how the individual attributes
of a particular decision must be scrutinized in determining which safe-
guards should be provided, we shall briefly discuss three specific "due
process" safeguards: (1) the location of the hearing, (2) the right
to counsel, (3) the burden of proof.
7. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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The location of the hearing
In Morrissey the Supreme Court took a first step toward incorpo-
rating this factor of a fair location into the due process equation; and,
although it did not articulate this rationale, it did evaluate the fairness
of location in terms of the substantive content of the inquiry. The
Morrissey decision intially identified two separate substantive issues
which were embodied in any parole revocation decision: first, a "fac-
tuar' inquiry had to be undertaken to determine whether the parolee
had actually committed a violation of his parole; second, if a parole
violation were found, a policy decision had to be rendered as to whether,
in view of the parolee's entire history, such violation warranted the re-
vocation of parole and recommitment to prison, or whether some
other steps-such as imposition of new conditions of parole-would
be preferable. 9
The Morrissey court accordingly set out a two stage series of
hearings, paralleling, although not precisely, the dual substantive is-
sues it had previously identified. 10 As envisioned by the court, the
parole revocation process would begin with a "preliminary hearing"
type proceeding, which would determine whether there was "probable
or reasonable cause" to believe that the parolee had in fact violated
his parole. With respect to the initial inquiry, the court held that
"due process would seem to require that some minimal inquiry be con-
ducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or
arrest.... " The second hearing, which might be conducted as much
as two months after the first inquiry, would determine definitively if
a parole violation had occurred and also would decide the appropriate
sanction for the violation. The Court assumed, however, that this sec-
ond hearing would not be held in the vicinity of the parole violation
but rather would be conducted at a more centralized location, such as
the state penitentiary."2
Insofar as the initial "preliminary hearing" is intended to focus
primarily on the factual questions of whether the parolee did or did
not violate his parole, the Morrissey court was clearly on sound ground
in insisting that "due process . .. require[s] that [such] inquiry be
conducted at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation
. ,,1 A local hearing is necessary to insure the defendant that
8. Id. at 479.
9. Id. at 480.
10. Id. at 484-89.
11. Id. at 485.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 485.
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his right to present witnesses is a meaningful one; such a local hearing
likewise serves the interests of the state by eliminating the expense of
transporting the prosecuting witnesses. Thus, this portion of Morrissey
supports the proposition that when the underlying substantive issue of
a hearing turns on a factual occurrence and involves the credibility of
eyewitnesses and the like, due process requires that such hearing be
held reasonably near the site of the alleged occurrence so the respond-
ent's opportunity to defend is made meaningful.
The Morrissey decision, however, does not entirely adhere to this
principle. Thus, although the court first recognizes the importance of
having the factual questions fully aired in the vicinity of the alleged
violation, it goes on to hold that the "hearing officer" who hears the
evidence at the local site need not decide whether a violation occurred
but should determine only whether there is "probable cause" to believe
that such a violation occurred. 4 The definitive resolution of the initial
factual question is postponed until the subsequent hearing is conducted
at a removed location.
Although at first blush this dual hearing may appear as an amel-
iorative approach, giving the accused parolee two chances to rebut the
charges against him, in reality the procedure may dilute the protection
seemingly afforded the parolee. The advantage of a local hearing is
that it makes possible the receipt of evidence from the actual witnesses
to the alleged event; conflicts in testimony and questions of credibility
can thus be determined by a trier of fact who has had an opportunity
to observe the participating witnesses in person. If the trier of fact
in this local hearing is not given the responsibility of resolving such
conflicts or evaluating such credibility, however, and need only deter-
mine whether "probable cause" exists, then the parolee loses much of
the benefit of the local hearing. When such conflicts are resolved by
the parole boards in the subsequent, distant hearing, such board well
may not have the benefit of examining the personal demeanor of the
witnesses and may be compelled to rely only on the summary of evi-
dence related by the initial hearing officer.
Moreover, this postponement of the definitive finding on the fac-
tual question may not only inure to the detriment of a parolee who
cannot afford to transport witnesses to a distant hearing, but as a practi-
cal matter it may be unduly costly for the state as well. Under Morris-
sey, a parolee, in general, has the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, both at the "preliminary hearing" and at the subse-
14. Id. at 486-87.
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quent "final" hearing, since the factual question of actual violation is at
issue in both proceedings. This will mean that in many cases the state
will have to bear the expense of transporting prosecuting witnesses from
the locale of the violation to the centralized parole board hearings; the
expense of such an undertaking could be considerable, and in many
cases it is conceivable that such expense, in itself, might lead the state
to forego revocation.
Viewing the proper location of hearings purely from the stand-
point of the substantive content of the inquiry, we believe that the Mor-
rissey court might have been better advised to provide for the definitive
resolution of the factual questions at the local hearing and to leave only
the general judgment to the subsequent proceeding before the parole
board. Indeed, a state on its own might well decide to adopt such
an approach notwithstanding Morrissey's contrary suggestion; certainly
there is nothing in Morrissey to prevent a state from affording more
protection to the parolee by providing that at the initial hearing the
parolee can only be detained if the hearing officer finds that there has
actually been a violation, rather than only that "probable cause" indi-
cates that a violation occurred.
In sum, by postponing the ultimate decision on the factual question
of violation to the second distant hearing, the Morrissey court to some
extent undermined the value of the initial local hearing; in this case
the purpose of a particular procedure-a fair location-should perhaps
have led the court to hold that the final factual decision should be
reached at the local hearing.
Right to Counsel
The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Gagnon v.
Scarpelli'5 decided in May 1973, provides a second illustration of how
the substance of a due process inquiry may determine its procedural
make-up, in this case with respect to the procedural safeguard of right
to counsel. In Gagnon the court addressed the question of whether
due process requires that a parolee or probationer be afforded a lawyer
at his parole or probation revocation hearing, an issue which the earlier
Morrissey opinion had specifically left open. 16
Justice Powell, writing for a nearly unanimous court, refused to
treat the "right to counsel" question as an "all or nothing" proposition,
and held instead that the necessity for affording counsel in a parole
15. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
16. 408 U.S. at 489.
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or probation revocation proceeding turned on "the need or the likeli-
hood in a particular case for a constructive contribution by counsel."lT
In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that in many revoca-
tion matters, the probationer or parolee has already been convicted
of, or has admitted committing, a second crime and in such cases no
significant factual issue may remain that would require counsel's pres-
ence. The court also noted that in many revocation proceedings, the
parolee or probationer's claim of mitigating circumstances is a simple
one requiring little investigation or exposition by counsel. 8
The Gagnon court made clear, however, that whenever the nature
or complexity of a particular revocation inquiry does indicate that the
presence of counsel is needed to provide the parolee or probationer a
fair hearing, the Constitution does require that a lawyer be provided,
and at the state's expense if the individual cannot afford one himself.
Although Justice Powell did not attempt to devise a detailed set of
standards for testing under precisely what circumstances counsel could
be considered essential, he did provide at least some tentative guidance.
He indicated that counsel should be provided where the parolee or pro-
bationer claims either (1) that he has not committed the alleged viola-
tion with which he is charged, or (2) that there are "substantial reasons
which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inap-
propriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to
develop or present."' 9
Thus, the approach of Gagnon basically coincides with the analysis
outlined above-the constitutional requirement of right to counsel turns
not upon the severity of the sanction or the administrative nature of
the proceeding, but rather upon the underlying substance of the hearing
and the need for counsel in relation to that substance.
We suggest, however, that Gagnon's determination that due proc-
ess does not require counsel for every parole revocation proceeding
should not be interpreted as any sort of directive to parole boards that
counsel should not as a matter of policy be made available in all revoca-
tion proceedings. Although Justice Powell intimates that in his opinion
counsel will not be required in a significant number, perhaps even a
majority, of revocation hearings, experience may well prove that predic-
tion inaccurate. If it turns out that in the bulk of revocation proceed-
ings the substance of the inquiry does call for the assistance of counsel,
17. 411 U.S. at 787.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 790.
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both legislative and administrative bodies may decide to supply counsel
as a matter of course, thus eliminating the need for making that indi-
vidual determination in every case.
Although the Gagnon decision deals with the right to counsel in
the probation or parole revocation context, other due process settings
may bring different relevant factors into play. In prison disciplinary
hearings, for example, the adjudicatory process performs almost always
a traditional fact-finding role, analogous to a criminal trial. A prisoner
will generally be charged with violating an established prison rule, and
the determination of the charge will depend upon the testimony of
,eyewitnesses and the presentation of circumstantial evidence. This
trial-like setting, of course, is the milieu in which the lawyers have tradi-
tionally operated.
Several distinctions between such disciplinary proceedings and
criminal trials, however, have led those few courts which have faced
this issue to stop short of holding that lawyers must be provided before
any disciplinary sanction can be imposed. In the first place, many disci-
plinary infractions are relatively simple in nature and do not require
professional, expert defense; second, because of the unique circumstances
of the prison environment, witnesses are not likely to disappear. Given
these considerations, and the additional and weighty factor of the great
economic cost in providing counsel for all prison disciplinary matters,
several lower federal courts have interpreted the due process guarantee
as requiring representation by counsel only in the case of complex and
serious disciplinary matters in which a prisoner is threatened with severe
sanctions such as a substantial confinement in an isolation cell. 0 For
other, simpler disciplinary matters, courts have either declined to re-
quire legal representation at all or else have fashioned a compromise
by suggesting the use of "counsel substitutes" in the form of law stu-
dents or fellow prisoners with some legal experience.
Burden of Proof
We shall discuss one final example of how the issue presented
by the hearing influences the procedural incidents of that hearing, this
time with respect to the quasi-procedural issue of "burden of proof."
The substantive inquiry of a particular due process hearing influ-
ences the "burden of proof" question not by establishing one particular
standard that must be applied to the hearing, but instead by setting
20. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971);
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 778 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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limits on the range of standards that can possibly be required. Two
examples will illustrate this point. In the context of prison disciplinary
hearings, in which the substance of the inquiry is the traditional ques-
tion of determining the truth of a particular factual accusation, a wide
range of "burden of proof' could conceivably be imposed: the state
could be obligated to prove that a prisoner violated a given rule beyond
a reasonable doubt, by clear and convincing evidence, by a prepond-
erance of the evidence or perhaps even by only presenting substantial
evidence that the prisoner may have committed the proscribed act.
By contrast, the possible "burden of proof' standards that can
be applied in parole release hearings or in the second stage of parole
revocation hearings are much more limited; in this context the substan-
tive inquiry is not one of fact-finding but of judgment and prediction:
has the prisoner demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation to warrant re-
lease? Is the prisoner likely to commit another criminal act if granted
parole? These substantive inquiries, by their very judgmental and dis-
cretionary nature, invalidate any use of a "beyond a reasonable doubt"
test. Because the answers to these questions are not susceptible of any
specific proof, the decision-makers cannot be held to a strict burden
of proof standard.
Conclusion
The main thrust of our suggested analysis is that in determining
which procedural safeguards should be afforded in various due process
settings, we must analyze the function of the particular safeguard with
respect to the substantive issue of the particular hearing in question.
Procedural due process is not unlike a legal chameleon that takes on
its color and nature in accordance with the underlying substantive issue
to be resolved. In the prison context the differing nature of the various
due process settings may well call for the utilization of fundamentally
different hearing procedures in each context.
We have concentrated in this article on what might be considered
a somewhat technical aspect of the entire subject of due process in the
prison context. But while the evaluation of particular procedural safe-
guards may appear an overly technical exercise, in the long run it is
the nature of just such procedural guarantees that provides the surest
protection against the excesses of arbitrary abuse of power. As Justice
Felix Frankfurter observed more than 25 years ago: 'The history of
liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safe-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
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guards. '21 To the extent that recent due process decisions succeed in
opening the prison system to -the light of public inquiry and in restoring
some dignity to the inmates of America's correctional institutions, they
will have done so largely by surrounding prisoners with those procedural
safeguards necessary to secure fair decisions at the hands of prison offi-
cials.
21. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).

